2013年12月19日星期四

首席执行官投资周期

在经济理论的世界中,有时在员工的思想中,一家公司的首席执行官是一家全景,全面知识策划者,在底线上具有无情的眼睛。但是,似乎平均CEO有一个典型的职业轨迹:花几年清理过去的过去的投资错误,然后开始扩大公司的投资,并通过过度扩张完成 - 下一步首席执行官有一堆投资犯错误,循环可以重新开始。Yihui Pan,Tracy Yue Wang和Michael S. Weisbach提供了“首席执行官投资周期”的证据,该证据于“全国经济研究工作纸”中公布。虽然有些读者可以通过图书馆订阅可以访问,但是可以通过图书馆订阅可以访问,但是可以使用这里

潘,王和Weisbach收集了1980年至2009年间公开交易美国公司的5,420名CEO的数据。他们收集数据是否出于年龄或健康的原因,或在某种特定压力下进行的。他们还有关于CEO是否从公司内部或外部雇用的数据。他们不看公司报告的利润,部分原因是利润数据至少是过去决定的结果而不是当前的决策,部分原因是由企业税务律师的利润数据往往是如此,它实际的经济意义可能不清楚。相反,他们看一下公司的年度投资模式。

"We estimate the magnitude of the CEO cycle in terms of the differences in disinvestment, investment, and firm growth, between the first three years of a CEO’s tenure and the later years, holding other factors constant. The magnitude of the changes in firm investment and growth over the CEO cycle is substantial. For example, the annual investment rate (investment-to-capital-stock ratio) tends to be 6 to 8 percentage points lower and the asset growth rate tends to be 3.2 percentage points lower in the first three years of a CEO’s tenure than in his later years in office. Given that the median investment rate in our sample is 24% and the median asset growth rate is 7.6%, the differences in investment and growth between the earlier and the later parts of the CEO cycle are clearly non-trivial. The effect of CEO cycle on investment is also of the same order of magnitude as the effects of other factors known to influence investment such as the business cycle, political uncertainty, and financial constraints."
他们的首选解释是,当首先指定首席执行官时,他们受到董事会的压力,以成为传说的无情的利润寻求者。但随着时间的推移,随着首席执行官任命更多董事会成员,首席执行官认为这一压力较少,并且有一个过度投资的趋势。

“首先,当一名首席执行官拿走时,他将举行激励措施,剥夺现任首席执行官成立并不愿意放弃的股票表现不佳。第二,由于许多原因,首席执行官通常更喜欢他们的公司成长,可能是以股东的成本增长maximization. The board of directors is an important constraint on CEOs’ ability to deviate from the shareholders’ interest. However, as the CEO becomes more powerful in the firm over time, he will have more sway over his board and will be able to undertake investments that maximize his utility, potentially at the expense of value. Eventually, when the CEO steps down, the process is repeated by the next CEO. ... We measure the CEO’s capture of the board by the fraction of the board that is appointed during his tenure, and find that the increasing CEO influence on the board over his tenure explains the positive relation between CEO tenure and investment. ... In addition, we find that the quality of a firm’s investments, measured by the market reaction to acquisition announcements, decreases with CEO tenure and becomes negative during the later portion of his time in office. The deteriorating investment quality is also related to the CEO’s control of the board."

他们还寻求评估一些可能的替代解释。但他们发现,例如,即使在首席执行官的营业额是由于死亡,疾病或退休的情况下,这种模式也是如此 - 因此它只是那个董事会消防首席执行官并没有表现良好。他们还发现这一效果既可以从内部和来自公司以外雇用的CEO,以及该行业受到大积极或负面惊喜的公司。

对我来说,分析使CEOS声音有点像体育队的教练一样:他们到达过去政权的错误,但随着时间的推移,他们中的许多人逐渐进入自己的一系列错误。它还表明,公司应严重思考其董事会独立,并以半定期旋转首席执行官。一名嫌疑人认为,他们所指定的首席执行官和董事之间的舒适关系不仅表现在公司的投资选择中,而且可能在执行赔偿和其他公司决策中出现。