"We estimate the magnitude of the CEO cycle in terms of the differences in disinvestment, investment, and firm growth, between the first three years of a CEO’s tenure and the later years, holding other factors constant. The magnitude of the changes in firm investment and growth over the CEO cycle is substantial. For example, the annual investment rate (investment-to-capital-stock ratio) tends to be 6 to 8 percentage points lower and the asset growth rate tends to be 3.2 percentage points lower in the first three years of a CEO’s tenure than in his later years in office. Given that the median investment rate in our sample is 24% and the median asset growth rate is 7.6%, the differences in investment and growth between the earlier and the later parts of the CEO cycle are clearly non-trivial. The effect of CEO cycle on investment is also of the same order of magnitude as the effects of other factors known to influence investment such as the business cycle, political uncertainty, and financial constraints."他们的首选解释是，当首先指定首席执行官时，他们受到董事会的压力，以成为传说的无情的利润寻求者。但随着时间的推移，随着首席执行官任命更多董事会成员，首席执行官认为这一压力较少，并且有一个过度投资的趋势。
“首先，当一名首席执行官拿走时，他将举行激励措施，剥夺现任首席执行官成立并不愿意放弃的股票表现不佳。第二，由于许多原因，首席执行官通常更喜欢他们的公司成长，可能是以股东的成本增长maximization. The board of directors is an important constraint on CEOs’ ability to deviate from the shareholders’ interest. However, as the CEO becomes more powerful in the firm over time, he will have more sway over his board and will be able to undertake investments that maximize his utility, potentially at the expense of value. Eventually, when the CEO steps down, the process is repeated by the next CEO. ... We measure the CEO’s capture of the board by the fraction of the board that is appointed during his tenure, and find that the increasing CEO influence on the board over his tenure explains the positive relation between CEO tenure and investment. ... In addition, we find that the quality of a firm’s investments, measured by the market reaction to acquisition announcements, decreases with CEO tenure and becomes negative during the later portion of his time in office. The deteriorating investment quality is also related to the CEO’s control of the board."
他们还寻求评估一些可能的替代解释。但他们发现，例如，即使在首席执行官的营业额是由于死亡，疾病或退休的情况下，这种模式也是如此 - 因此它只是那个董事会消防首席执行官并没有表现良好。他们还发现这一效果既可以从内部和来自公司以外雇用的CEO，以及该行业受到大积极或负面惊喜的公司。